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INTRODUCTION
The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods (CISG) is the first model commercial law to
gain widespread international acceptance. Over 60 states, including
the United States, China, Russia, and France, have ratified the CISG,
making it the default substantive law governing contracts for the sale
of goods between a buyer and a seller from different Contracting
States. However, the CISG has not been as readily applied in the United
States as it has in other countries.
It is easy to see why North Carolina practitioners would be reluc-
tant to select an unfamiliar body of law to govern potential disputes
between the commercial buyers and sellers they represent. The CISG
contains provisions that are significantly different from the familiar
principles of North Carolina's version of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.). For instance, the CISG does not exclude parol evidence
of contractual terms, requires no writing for a valid contract, and
maintains the "mirror image" rule. Despite the differences that may
make a North Carolina practitioner wary, the CISG contains sufficient
protections for contracting parties, and in fact, serves the interests of
international buyers and sellers of goods better than North Carolina's
version of the U.C.C.
Part I of this article will discuss the history and purpose of the
CISG. Part II will consider the applicability of the CISG to interna-
tional commercial contracts where one contracting party is from the
United States. Part III will discuss some notable differences between
the CISG and North Carolina law. Finally, Part IV will consider situa-
* Alicia Jurney Whitlock is an associate in the litigation practice group of Smith
Debnam Narron Drake Saintsing & Myers, L.L.P. in Raleigh, North Carolina.
** Boris S. Abbey is a Ph.D. candidate in Finance at Old Dominion University.
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tions in which the CISG may better serve the interests of parties to a
contract for the international sale of goods than the U.C.C. or North
Carolina common law.
I. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE CISG
The CISG, also known as the Vienna Convention, (and simply as
"the Convention") stands for the United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods. The CISG is a set of rules
that governs the rights of sellers and buyers that engage in contracts
involving the international sale of goods. It is a set of substantive rules,
not procedural rules, that governs the means by which a court or arbi-
tral tribunal will resolve a dispute.'
A. Historical Background
The CISG was developed as a solution to the problems resulting
from complexities of law encountered when parties from two different
states 2 enter into a contract for the sale of goods. Its purpose is to
provide a body of law that will be accepted and uniformly applied by
states with different legal systems.3 The initial draft of the CISG (the
1978 Draft Convention) was completed in 1978.' The Draft Commit-
tee established by the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) completed the final version in the spring of
1980, and it was ultimately passed by a two-thirds majority at the
Vienna Conference on April 11, 1980.' As of July 17, 2007, seventy
nations have ratified the Convention.6
1. Predecessors
The predecessors to the CISG are the Uniform Law on the Forma-
tion of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULF) and the
1. JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN THE USA 6 (2d ed. 2004).
2. As used in this article, the term "states" is synonymous with countries.
3. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods pmbl., Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9 (1986)
[hereinafter CISGI.
4. PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAw-THE UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 18 (1986), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.
edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem.html.
5. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 4, at 17-19.
6. See United Nations Comm. on Int'l Trade Law, Status: 1980 United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (2007), http://www.
uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral texts/salegoods/1980CISGstatus.html
[hereinafter CISG Status].
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Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS).7 The founda-
tion for the CISG, the ULF, and the ULIS was laid in the 1920s by a
group of European scholars, which included Ernest Rabel, who saw a
need for a uniform law.8 Their idea quickly took hold, and the Inter-
national Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) con-
vened a working group to begin drafting a uniform body of law
governing the international sale of goods.9 UNIDROIT's progress was
halted during World War II, but efforts toward development resumed
following the war's conclusion.'
After the war, a sales conference at The Hague, attended predomi-
nately by Western European states, reviewed the pre-war draft created
by the UNIDROIT working group and planned for continuing develop-
ment of the uniform law." By 1956, an initial draft was completed
and, at the Hague Convention of April 1964, UNIDROIT adopted the
ULF and the ULIS. 12 The ULF established uniform rules for contract
formation. 13 The ULIS had a much broader application and set forth
the basic obligations of the parties to a sales contract for goods.
1 4
Despite the significance of the development of the ULF and ULIS,
neither was widely adopted by the international community. 15 Many
states, including the United States, were very critical of the uniform
laws. 16  To address the concerns of these states, UNCITRAL estab-
lished a new Working Group composed of fourteen states to review the
inadequacies of the ULF and ULIS and to develop a comprehensive
7. See SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 4, at 16.
8. Jacob S. Ziegel, The Future of the International Sales Convention from a Common
Law Perspective, 6 N.Z. Bus. L.Q. 336, 336 (2000), available at http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.
edu/cisg/biblio/ziegel3.html.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Peter Winship, The Scope of the Vienna Convention on International Sales
Contracts, in INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS § 1.01 (Nina M. Galston & Hans Smit eds.,
1984), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/winship5.html.
12. Id.
13. See generally Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 3
I.L.M. 855, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/m/unidroit.ulis.convention.1964/
portrait.pdf.
14. See generally Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 3 1.L.M. 854, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/
unidroit.ulf.convention. 1964/landscape.pdf.
15. See Winship, supra note 11, at § 1.01.
16. Id.
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body of rules that would be more acceptable.' 7 In 1978, UNCITRAL
approved a new body of rules, the Draft Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, which effectively combined ULF and
ULIS. 18 The Draft Convention was the first draft of what would
become the CISG.
B. Purpose
The purpose of the CISG is stated in its Preamble.' 9 Its principal
goal is the promotion of friendly relations between states by the adop-
tion of a set of uniform rules to govern contracts for the international
sale of goods.2° The Preamble also recites the opinion of the drafters
that adopting the uniform rules of the CISG, which "take into account
the different social, economic and legal systems[,] would contribute to
the removal of legal barriers in international trade and promote the
development of international trade."'"
1. Harmonization of Common Law and Civil Law Principles
One primary function of the CISG is to harmonize common law
and civil law legal principles.22 International sales transactions can
involve parties who come from states with very different legal back-
grounds. Contracts for the sale of goods in an international business
environment regularly cross legal boundaries between common law
and civil law states. Any uniform international commercial body of
law must therefore take into consideration both types of legal systems.
The CISG specifically "seeks to maintain a delicate balance between
the contrasting attitudes and concepts of the civil law and of the com-
mon law" in order to achieve international uniformity.23 Maintaining
this balance required the drafters to make compromises in certain pro-
visions of the CISG. For example, the requirement of good faith con-
tained in Article 7(1) of the CISG is not generally recognized in
17. John Honnold, The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law:
Mission and Methods, 27 AM. J. CoMP. L. 201, 209 n.25 (1979).
18. Id. at 203.
19. See CISG, supra note 3, pmbl.
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. Jurgen Basedow, Towards a Universal Doctrine of Breach of Contract: The Impact
of the CISG, 25 INT'L R.L. ECON. 486, 487-88 (2005), available at http://cisgw3.1aw.
pace.edu/cisg/biblio/basedow.html.
23. William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (codified and
uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677, 718 (2000), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/
cisg/biblio/tetley.html (quoting Roy GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW 927 (2d ed., Penguin
Books 1995)).
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English common law, but is an important concept in civil law states."
Furthermore, the principles of interpretation of the CISG follow both
an objective approach, an important common law concept, and a sub-
jective approach, followed in civil law states.25
2. Uniform Interpretation
The compromise between civil and common law states, accompa-
nied by a body of law that is uniformly applied, creates an environ-
ment in which parties from different states feel comfortable engaging
in commercial transactions. The drafters of the CISG recognized that a
uniform interpretation of the rules was necessary to ensure wide-
spread use. Consequently the drafters attempted to eliminate collo-
quial language, called "domestic baggage," when drafting the CISG.26
II. APPLICATION OF THE CISG TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS WHERE ONE PARTY IS FROM THE UNITED STATES
When the CISG is the substantive law that applies to a contract for
the sale of goods, whether by operation of law or express agreement of
the parties, its provisions will govern the formation of the contract and
the rights and obligations of the buyer and seller.27 Issues that are gov-
erned but not settled by the CISG should be resolved in accordance
with the general principles upon which the CISG is based,28 such as
"good faith, reasonableness, and estoppel. '' 29 If an issue cannot be set-
tled by looking to the CISG's general principles, then as a last resort,
the tribunal should resolve it by applying the appropriate domestic
law.3°
Whether practitioners would like for the CISG to govern resolu-
tion of a dispute or would prefer to avoid it altogether, it is important
to understand the circumstances under which the CISG applies to
commercial sales contracts so that they can represent their clients
24. Roy GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW 931-32 (2d ed., Penguin Books 1995).
25. Id.
26. Vikki M. Rogers & Albert H. Kritzer, A Uniform International Sales Law
Terminology, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR PETER SCHLECHTRIEM ZUM 70, 223, 226 (Ingeborg
Schwenzer & Gunter Hager eds., 2003), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/
cisg/biblio/rogers2.html.
27. CISG, supra note 3, art. 4.
28. Id., art. 7(2).
29. LooKoFsKY, supra note 1, at 36 (footnote call numbers omitted).
30. Peter Schlechtriem, Requirements of Application and Sphere of Applicability of the
CISG, 36 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 781, 789-91 (2005).
2008]
5
Whitlock and Abbey: Who's Afraid of the CISG? Why North Carolina Practitioners Should
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2008
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
accordingly. 3 ' The application of the CISG to contracts entered into by
parties from the United States occurs as a result of ratification and
adoption of the CISG, which was signed on behalf of the United States
at United Nations Headquarters on August 31, 1981 and went into
effect in 1988.
A. Application under CISG Art. 1(1)
Article 1 of the CISG is the starting point for application of the
Convention:
(1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between par-
ties whose places of business are in different States:
(a) when the States are Contracting States; or
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the applica-
tion of the law of a Contracting State.
(2) The fact that the parties have their places of business in different
States is to be disregarded whenever this fact does not appear either
from the contract or from any dealings between, or from information
disclosed by, the parties at any time before or at the conclusion of the
contract.
(3) Neither the nationality of the parties nor the civil or commercial
character of the parties or of the contract is to be taken into considera-
tion in determining the application of this Convention. 32
Under Article 1, the Convention will apply only if two requirements
are met: (1) the seller and the buyer have their places of business in
different States; and (2) both of these States are Contracting States
(i.e., states that have adopted the CISG). In addition to these require-
ments, the United States ratified the Convention subject to an Article
95 declaration.33 The result of this declaration is that an American
court will apply the CISG by default only to contracts involving sales
with an international character between parties in whose countries the
Convention is in force. 34
31. In GPL Treatment v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., counsel for the plaintiffs failed to
recognize that the CISG applied to the parties' contract, which would have made the
statute of frauds defense raised by the defendant inapplicable. 894 P.2d 470, 477 n.4
(Or. Ct. App. 1995). See also William S. Dodge, Teaching the CISG in Contracts, 50 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 72, 74 (March 2000) (noting that plaintiffs' counsel gave up an argument
that was "a sure winner").
32. CISG, supra note 3, art. 1.
33. See CISG Status, supra note 6.
34. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 95.
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1. Between Parties Whose Places of Business Are in Different
Contracting States
The threshold issue when determining whether the CISG will
apply to any given dispute is to determine whether the parties to the
contract have their respective places of business in different Con-
tracting States. A good example of this application is highlighted by
Professor Lookofsky:
[11f a contract for the sale of wine is entered into in January 2000
between a seller in France and a buyer in California (France and the
United States being different Contracting States), both French and
American courts are bound by Article 1(1)(a) of the treaty to apply the
CISG as the gap-filling regime. In this situation, the Convention applies
without any recourse to rules of private international law; indeed, in
this situation there is no conflict between the domestic sales laws of
the US and France.35
Accordingly, the CISG will apply under Article 1(1)(a) to any contract
for the sale of goods between a party from the United States and party
from another Contracting State.
2. Rules of Private International Law Lead to the Law of a
Contracting State
The second situation arises when one or both parties do not
reside in a Contracting State. Article 1(1)(b) applies when "private
international rules," the domestic conflict of laws rules of a particular
state, direct the court or arbitral tribunal to the CISG.36 Another hypo-
thetical demonstrates this application:
[I]f a contract for the sale of wine is made in January 2000 between a
seller in France and a buyer in England, French courts would not be
bound by Article l(l)(a) to apply the CISG as the gap-filling regime: the
contract is of course between parties residing in different States, but
because England (as of January 2000) is still not a CISG Contracting
State, the different States concerned are not different "Contracting
States." (Of course, English courts are not bound to apply the Conven-
tion either.) But the Convention becomes applicable nonetheless - at
least in a French court - if the applicable rules of private international
35. Joseph Lookofsky, The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAws-CONTRACTs 32
(J. Herbots ed., Supp. 29 2000), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/
lookofsky.html.
36. Id.
2008]
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law (i.e., the choice of law or conflict of laws rules of the forum court)
lead to the application of the law of a (single) Contracting State. 37
Thus, although the CISG strives to promote uniformity, the domestic
laws of Contracting States still play a role and can lead to different
results.
3. United States' Article 95 Declaration
Article 95 was the drafters' effort to address the concerns
expressed by many about Article 1(1)(b).38 Several states, including
the United States and China, have adopted the CISG subject to an Arti-
cle 95 declaration. 39 Thus, when the domestic conflict of laws rules of
the United States lead to United States domestic law, under which the
CISG would ordinarily apply by default under Article 1(1)(a), the
court or arbitral tribunal is not bound to apply the CISG under Article
1(1)(b) if one party is not from a Contracting State.4 ° However, the
court or tribunal still has the discretion to apply the CISG, so an Arti-
cle 95 declaration does not guarantee that the CISG will be
inapplicable.4 1
III. NOTABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CISG AND NORTH
CAROLINA LAW
The CISG provides a more flexible approach to contract formation
and interpretation than the U.C.C.4 2 While a contract for the sale of
goods for five hundred dollars or more is unenforceable unless it is
evidenced by a writing under the U.C.C., 43 the CISG allows an enforce-
able contract for the sale of goods at any price to be formed without a
written document.4 4 The CISG also rejects the parol evidence rule,45
37. Id. at 33.
38. See 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Vienna, Austria, Apr. 10, 1980,
Summary Records of the First Committee to the Plenary Conference, 1I 78-98, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97/11/Add.2, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/plenary
committee/summary 11 .html.
39. See CISG Status, supra note 6.
40. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 95.
41. LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, at 158-59.
42. As used in this article, the term "U.C.C." means the Uniform Commercial Code
version enacted in North Carolina, which is codified in Chapter 25 of the North
Carolina General Statutes.
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201 (2007).
44. CISG, supra note 3, art. 11.
45. CISG AC Opinion no. 3, Parol Evidence Rule, Plain Meaning Rule, Contractual
Merger Clause and the CISG, 23 October 2004.
[Vol. 30:275
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and in contrast to the U.C.C., 4 6 allows oral statements made prior to or
contemporaneous with the signing of a written contract to become part
of the parties' agreement. 47 The CISG's flexibility in these areas mini-
mizes the potential negative consequences of its battle-of-the-forms
approach,48 a common law rule replaced by the framework of U.C.C.
section 2-207. 4"
A. Writing Requirements
Unlike the U.C.C., which requires contracts for the sale of goods
valued at five hundred dollars or more to be in writing, the CISG does
not impose a writing requirement on parties to contracts for the sale of
goods at any price. Instead, the existence and terms of a contract may
be proved by any means, including testimony of witnesses or the con-
duct of the parties.
1. Statute of Frauds
North Carolina's version of U.C.C. section 2-201,s° the statute of
frauds, states:
[A] contract for the sale of goods for the price of five hundred dollars
($500.00) is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is
some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been
made between the parties and signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought. 5 '
North Carolina General Statutes section 25-2-201 differs slightly from
the 2000 uniform version of section 2-201 in that North Carolina law
does not make enforceable contracts signed by the authorized agent or
broker of the party against whom enforcement is sought.52
When North Carolina enacted Article 2 of the U.C.C. in 1965, this
provision made the statute of frauds applicable to contracts for the sale
of goods for the first time in nearly two hundred years.53 The North
Carolina Supreme Court, in a decision published in 1908, noted "the
46. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-202 (2007).
47. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 8(3).
48. See id., art. 19.
49. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-207 (2007).
50. Like most states, North Carolina has not enacted the 2006 amendments to
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Thus, the 2000 version of the U.C.C. is the
most recent version to which Article 2 of Chapter 25 of the North Carolina General
Statutes is comparable.
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201(1) (2007).
52. Contrast N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201(1) (2007) with U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (2000).
53. Odom v. Clark, 60 S.E. 513, 515 (N.C. 1908).
20081
9
Whitlock and Abbey: Who's Afraid of the CISG? Why North Carolina Practitioners Should
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2008
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
English statute of frauds, '5 4 which required contracts for the sale of
goods above a certain value to be in writing, had "not been in force [in
North Carolina] since 1792. ''s
Under the exceptions to the statute of frauds enumerated in North
Carolina General Statutes section 25-2-201, a contract for the sale of
goods at a price of five hundred or more may be enforceable without a
writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought. For
example, contracts for specially manufactured goods may be enforcea-
ble by the seller without a writing. 56 Between merchants, 57 a confir-
matory writing sent within a reasonable time after an oral agreement is
made is enforceable against the receiving party unless the receiving
party notifies the sender of his objection within 10 days of receipt.5,
Additionally, a contract will be enforceable without a writing as to the
quantity admitted in court by a party against whom enforcement is
sought.59
The U.C.C. also provides for a limited part performance exception
to the statute of frauds. Under section 2-201, a contract for the sale of
goods is enforceable to the extent that payment has been made or that
goods have been received and accepted by the buyer.6" In some states,
part performance and estoppel principles will remove an entire con-
tract from the statute of frauds. 61 In North Carolina, however, the pro-
tection afforded by the part performance doctrine is limited to the
provisions of North Carolina General Statutes section 25-2-201(3)(c).
2. Writing Not Required for a Valid Contract under CISG Article 11
Unlike the U.C.C., oral contracts for the sale of goods at any price
are enforceable under the CISG. Article 11 of the CISG states, "A con-
tract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201(3)(a) (2007).
57. The term "merchant" is defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-104 (2007) as "a
person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself
out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
transaction..." One who employs "an agent or broker or other intermediary who by
his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill" may also be
considered a merchant under this section.
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201(2) (2007).
59. § 25-2-201(3)(b).
60. § 25-2-201(3)(c).
61. See, e.g., Royster-Clark, Inc. v. Olsen's Mill, Inc., 714 N.W.2d 530 (Wis. 2006);
Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, Inc., 39 P.3d 1051 (Wyo. 2002); Allied
Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 249 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th 1988).
[Vol. 30:275
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not subject to any other requirement as to form. It may be proved by
any means, including witnesses. '62 Recognizing that the domestic
laws of some states attach significance to contractual formalities, the
CISG allows a state "whose legislation requires contracts of sale to be
concluded in or evidenced by writing '6 3 to make an Article 96 reserva-
tion, under which the provisions of Article 11 are inapplicable to con-
tracts concluded in that state.64 Nine states have ratified the CISG
with an Article 96 reservation.65 Interestingly, although the domestic
laws of the United States typically require contracts to be concluded in
writing, the United States did not make an Article 96 reservation.66
An Article 96 reservation does not necessarily guarantee that a
particular state's domestic laws on contractual formalities will apply.
When only one party to a contract is from a state that made an Article
96 reservation, the tribunal will apply conflict-of-laws rules 67 to deter-
mine which state's law governs contractual formalities. 68 Even when a
contract involves a party in a state that made an Article 96 reservation,
if conflict-of-laws analysis leads to the application of another Con-
tracting State's law, the tribunal may enforce an oral agreement under
Article 11. For example, if a party from the United States enters into a
sales contract with a party from Russia, a state that made an Article 96
reservation, 69 the no-writing-requirement principle of Article 11 would
still apply if the application of conflict-of-laws rules led to the domestic
law of the United States.7"
62. CISG, supra note 3, art. 11.
63. Id., art. 96.
64. Id.; see also 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Vienna, Austria, Mar. 17,
1980, Summary Records of the First Committee, q1 9-66, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/5,
available at http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cisg/firstcommittee/Meeting8.html.
65. The nine states that made an Article 96 reservation are Argentina, Belarus,
Chile, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Paraguay, Russia, and Ukraine. See CISG Status,
supra note 6.
66. See id.
67. "[North Carolina's] traditional conflict of laws rule is that matters affecting the
substantial rights of the parties are determined by lex loci, the law of the situs of the
claim, and remedial or procedural rights are determined by lex fori, the law of the
forum." Stetser v. TAP Pharm. Prods. Inc., 598 S.E.2d 570, 580 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)
(quoting Boudreau v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849, 853-54 (N.C. 1988)).
68. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 4; LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, at 159-60.
69. See CISG Status, supra note 6.
70. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 1(1)(a). See, e.g., J.T. Schuermans/Boomsma
Distilleerderij, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme Court of the Netherlands],
7 November 1997, 1998 NIPR 91 (Neth.) (holding that the no-writing-requirement
principle of Article 11 applied to a contract between a buyer from Russia and a seller
from the Netherlands where conflict-of-laws rules led to the law of the Netherlands-
the CISG).
20081 285
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B. "Battle of the Forms"
Another major difference between the CISG and the U.C.C. is that
the CISG retains the common law "mirror image" and "last shot" rules
with respect to contract formation. Although these rules still apply to
contracts not governed by the U.C.C. in North Carolina, North Caro-
lina General Statutes section 25-2-207 eliminates the "battle of the
forms" and provides a different framework for determining the effect
of additional or different terms in an acceptance.
1. North Carolina General Statutes Section 25-2-207
Under North Carolina General Statutes section 25-2-207, an
acceptance of an offer or confirmation of an agreement "which is sent
within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it
states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed
upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the
additional or different terms."''7 Additional terms in an acceptance or
confirmation are considered "proposals for addition to the contract" 72
and must be explicitly accepted by the offeror, unless both parties are
merchants, in order to become part of the agreement. Where both par-
ties are merchants, the additional terms automatically become part of
the contract without explicit acceptance by the offeror unless "the offer
expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer, '73 the additional
terms materially alter the contract, 71 or "notification of objection to
[the additional terms] has already been given or is given within a rea-
sonable time after notice of them is received. 75
In some situations, the writings of the parties may not be suffi-
ciently in agreement to create a contract. For example, a merchant
buyer may place an order with a merchant seller by submitting an
order that specifies a certain quantity of goods to be purchased at a
particular price and states that the law of California will govern the
contract. This would constitute an offer.76 If the seller decides to
accept the offer, the seller might ship the goods to the buyer with an
invoice that reiterates the quantity and price, states that the law of
North Carolina will govern the contract, and provides that the seller
may collect interest on past-due invoices as allowed by law. Even
though the seller's reply is not the "mirror image" of the buyer's offer,
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-207(1) (2007).
72. § 25-2-207(2).
73. § 25-2-207(2)(a).
74. § 25-2-207(2)(b).
75. § 25-2-207(2)(c).
76. See § N.C. Gen. Stat. §25-2-206 (2007).
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it would be effective to create a contract under North Carolina General
Statutes section 25-2-207. The price would be as agreed by the parties,
since both writings stated the same price. Interest would accrue on
past-due invoices at a rate allowed by law, unless the buyer objected
within a reasonable time,77 because the addition of that term is not
considered a material alteration. 78
As to the contradictory choice-of-law provisions in the parties'
forms, under North Carolina's approach to different terms in an
acceptance, the term specified in the offer would prevail. 79 North Car-
olina General Statutes section 25-2-207(2) and the uniform version of
this section only apply expressly to additional terms and are silent on
the effect of different terms in an acceptance.8 0 Most jurisdictions have
adopted the "knock-out" rule under which contradictory terms in an
offer and acceptance are excluded from the parties' contract.8 t North
Carolina, however, follows a minority approach that treats different
terms in an acceptance as though they were additional terms and inter-
prets them in accordance with North Carolina General Statutes section
25-2-207(2). The effect of this approach is a "first-shot" rule-when
there are contradictory terms, the first form sent will control.8 2
2. "Battle of the Forms" under Article 19 of the CISG
Unlike the U.C.C., the CISG still applies the "mirror image" and
"last shot" rules to contract formation.83 Under Article 19, "[a] reply
to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additions,
limitations or other modifications is a rejection of the offer and consti-
tutes a counter-offer. 8s 4 According to the Secretariat Commentary to
the CISG, the language of Article 19(1) "reflects traditional theory that
contractual obligations arise out of expressions of mutual agreement.
Accordingly, an acceptance must comply exactly with the offer. 8 5
77. § 25-2-207(2)(c).
78. § 25-2-207 cmt. 5.
79. § 25-2-207 cmt.
80. See § 25-2-207(2); U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2000).
81. See Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1579-80 (10th Cir. 1984)
(discussing the three approaches to different terms under U.C.C. § 2-207).
82. See JOHN N. HUTSON, JR. & SCOTT A. MISKIMON, NORTH CAROLINA CONTRACT LAW
§ 7-5-3 (2007); Richard Hyland, Draft, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1348 (1997).
83. See Magellan Intern. Corp. v. Salzgitter Handel GmbH, 76 F. Supp. 2d 919, 925
(N.D. Ill. 1999).
84. CISG, supra note 3, art. 19(l).
85. United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
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The strict requirements of the first section of Article 19 are
relaxed a little by the second section, under which only additional or
different terms that "materially alter8 6 the terms of the offer" constitute
a counteroffer.87 Therefore, an acceptance will be effective even if it
includes non-material additional or different terms, unless the offeror
objects to the terms "without undue delay."88 If the offeror objects to
the non-material new terms, then the offeree's purported acceptance is
considered a rejection of the offer.89 Unlike North Carolina General
Statutes section 25-2-207, under which a contract would exist consist-
ing of the terms on which the writings of the parties agreed, there is no
contract at all if the offeror objects to non-material additional or differ-
ent terms. 9°
A. Parol Evidence
The views of the CISG and the U.C.C. on the admissibility of
extrinsic evidence to prove the existence or terms of a contract stem
from different approaches to ascertaining the parties' intent. Under the
objective approach of the U.C.C., contracting parties may not intro-
duce evidence of any prior written agreement or prior or contempora-
neous oral agreement to contradict the terms of a final written
agreement. 9' By contrast, consistent with its informal requirements as
to contract formation, the CISG's subjective approach permits parties
to prove the existence or terms of a contract by any means, including
parol evidence. 92
prepared by the Secretariat, art. 17 '1 2, UN Doc. A/CONF. 97/5 (1979) [hereinafter
Secretariat Commentary].
86. Examples of material terms are provided in Article 19(3) and include "price,
payment, quality and quantity of the goods, place and time of delivery, extent of one
party's liability to the other or the settlement of disputes." CISG, supra note 3, art.
19(3).
87. CISG, supra note 3, art. 19(2).
88. Id.
89. See Secretariat Commentary, supra note 85, art. 17 cj 10.
90. See id.
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-202 (2007).
92. CISG-AC Opinion no. 3, Parol Evidence Rule, Plain Meaning Rule, Contractual
Merger Clause and the CISG, 31 1, 23 October 2004 [hereinafter CISG-AC Opinion no.
3]. See also MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, S.P.A., 144
F.3d 1384, 1386-90 (11th Cir. 1998) (interpreting Article 8 of the CISG as a rejection
of the parol evidence rule).
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1. Parol Evidence Rule under North Carolina General Statutes
Section 25-2-202
In general, North Carolina General Statutes section 25-2-202 pre-
vents parties from introducing evidence of any prior or contemporane-
ous oral agreements or prior written agreements to vary the terms of a
final written agreement. 93 A party is permitted, however, to introduce
parol evidence of "course of performance, course of dealing, or usage
of trade"94 to supplement or explain an agreement. Furthermore, a
party may introduce evidence of "consistent additional terms" to sup-
plement or explain a writing unless the court considers the writing to
be a "complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the [parties']
agreement."
95
2. CISG's Rejection of the Parol Evidence Rule
The CISG permits the parties to prove the terms of a contract by
relevant evidence of any kind. Article 8(1) prioritizes the subjective
intent of each party in interpreting their contract, stating, "For the pur-
poses of this Convention statements made by and other conduct of a
party are to be interpreted according to his intent where the other
party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was."'96 In
an opinion released in 2004, the CISG Advisory Council expressly
rejected the parol evidence rule, stating, "The Parol Evidence Rule has
not been incorporated into the CISG. The CISG governs the role and
weight to be ascribed to contractual writing."97 Specifically, Article
8(3) of the CISG allows a tribunal to consider "all relevant circum-
stances '' g to determine the intent of the parties. Accordingly, "the
CISG indicates that a writing is one, but only one, of many circum-
stances to be considered when establishing and interpreting the terms
of a contract."99
IV. SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE CISG MAY BETTER SERVE THE INTERESTS
OF PARTIES TO A CONTRACT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
THAN THE U.C.C. OR NORTH CAROLINA COMMON LAW
Whether the CISG will better meet the needs of contracting par-
ties than Article 2 of the U.C.C. depends on the nature of the parties
93. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-202.
94. § 25-2-202(a) (internal citations omitted).
95. § 25-2-202(b).
96. CISG, supra note 3, art. 8(1).
97. CISG-AC Opinion no. 3, supra note 92, c 1.
98. CISG, supra note 3, art 8(3).
99. CISG-AC Opinion no. 3, supra note 92, cmt. 2.2.
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and transaction involved. The two uniform laws were drafted with dif-
ferent types of parties in mind. The U.C.C. was intended to apply to all
contracts for the sale of goods, including consumer sales, and its provi-
sions are written to encompass a broad range of transactions. 100 Parts
of Article 2 are therefore necessarily protective to prevent consumers
from being taken advantage of. In a number of sections, the U.C.C.
makes a distinction between merchants and non-merchants and holds
the latter to a higher standard than the former.1"' Although consumer-
protective provisions are important in domestic law, their inflexibility
is not well-suited to international commercial sales.
The CISG, on the other hand, was drafted specifically for interna-
tional commercial actors. Under Article 2(a), the CISG "does not apply
to sales of goods bought for personal, family or household use, unless
the seller, at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract,
neither knew nor ought to have known that the goods were bought for
any such use."'01 2 Leaving consumer protection in sales of goods trans-
actions to domestic law,'0 3 the CISG serves the interests of commercial
actors by giving them the freedom to define their contract without fear
that it will be invalidated for failing to comply with needlessly restric-
tive formalities.
The CISG's flexibility is better suited to contracts in which the
parties have selected arbitration instead of litigation as the method of
dispute resolution. When dealing with the court system, parties often
have little control over which judge will preside over their case. It is
likely that a North Carolina superior court judge, or even a federal
district court judge for that matter, would have little or no experience
with the CISG. 10 4 Subjecting a dispute to resolution before a judge
who is unfamiliar with the governing substantive law and for which
there is no North Carolina case precedent' 05 would almost certainly
100. See CHRISTIAN TWIGG-FLESNER, CONSUMER PRODUCT GUARANTEES 92 n.3 (2003)
("Article 2 of the U.C.C. deals with all types of sales and therefore has to be
sufficiently broad to cover the smallest of consumer sales as well as the large-scale
inter-state transactions.").
101. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207(2), 2-209(2), 2-312(3), 2-
314, 2-327(1)(c), 2-402(2) (2007).
102. CISG, supra note 3, art. 2(a).
103. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 4, at 31-32 (discussing deference to domestic law
with regard to consumer protection laws affecting validity of a contract pursuant to
Article 4).
104. See Dodge, supra note 31.
105. A LexisNexis search of North Carolina state and federal cases for the term
"CISG" returned only one case-an unpublished decision by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in which the court notes, "Case law interpreting the
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result in problems for everyone involved. However, by selecting arbitra-
tion as the method of dispute resolution, the parties can agree on a list
of potential arbitrators who have the knowledge and experience neces-
sary to correctly interpret and apply the CISG.
The benefits of resolving disputes governed by the CISG through
arbitration rather than litigation have important implications for prac-
titioners who draft commercial sales contracts. In cases in which the
CISG applies by default, 10 6 practitioners should include an arbitration
provision in the parties' agreement to avoid being subject to litigation.
If the parties would prefer to settle disputes arising from their contract
in the courts, then the choice-of-law provision should expressly state
that the U.C.C., not the CISG, is the controlling substantive law. 1°7
A. Contract Formation and Modification
One of the goals of the CISG is the harmonization of common law
and civil law principles in order to promote the development of inter-
national trade.'0 8 Although contractual formalities are well-known
requirements to parties from the United States, other cultures have a
less rigid approach.10 9 The CISG gives parties the freedom to define
the terms of their contract without imposing formalities that may hin-
der the purpose of the agreement by creating unnecessary delays in
performance. Initial contractual terms and modifications thereto need
not be memorialized in a signed writing to be enforceable." 0
The effect of North Carolina General Statutes section 25-2-201 is
to create a presumption against enforceability of agreements that can
only be rebutted by producing a signed writing."' While the statute
of frauds may serve a legitimate purpose in some cases by protecting
CISG is rather sparse." Schmitz-Werke GmbH & Co. v. Rockland Indus., Inc., No. 00-
1125, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 12336, at *8 (4th Cir. June 21, 2002).
106. See discussion supra Part II.
107. It is not enough to simply specify "the laws of the State of North Carolina" as
the governing substantive law. See Asante Techs. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d
1142, 1149-50 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
108. See discussion infra Part I.B.
109. See Bruno Zeller, The Parol Evidence Rule and the CISG-a Comparative Analysis,
73 COMP. & INT'L LJ.S. AFR. 308 (2003), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/
biblio/zeller6.html (noting the cultural differences in views on writing requirements
for enforceability).
110. If the parties choose to impose a writing requirement for contract
modifications, they can do so by including a no-oral-modification clause in their
agreement. See CISG, supra note 3, arts. 6, 29.
111. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201 (2007).
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parties who never intended to enter into a contract,"' it can cause
problems in others by invalidating an agreement to which both parties
intended to be bound. 1 3 In such cases, although an agreement actu-
ally exists between the parties, the terms cannot be enforced. The
CISG reaches a more favorable result than the U.C.C. in these cases,
because it recognizes that a contract may be concluded before the par-
ties have memorialized their agreement in a signed writing." 4
B. Additions and Modification of Terms of an Offer
The CISG's adherence to the "mirror image" and "last shot" rules
is a better way to protect the expectations of contracting parties than
the framework of North Carolina General Statutes section 25-2-207.
The CISG's principles regarding additional or different terms are pref-
erable in two respects. First, the CISG makes it less likely for buyers
and sellers to be contractually bound when the so-called "non-mate-
rial" additional or different 1 5 terms on the parties' standard forms
disagree. Second, the seller, who is typically the offeree in commercial
sales transactions, is better protected by the CISG's approach to differ-
ent terms, under which the terms in the last form sent control.
1. Existence of a Contract
Under the CISG, no contract is formed if an offeror objects to
additional or different terms included in an acceptance that are
deemed to be non-material. 116 By contrast, under North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes section 25-2-207, a contact between the parties will exist
that consists of the writings upon which the parties agree, supple-
mented as necessary by the gap-filler provisions of the U.C.C. 1 1 7 Even
though the terms of the parties' standard forms may be considered
non-material relative to other provisions of the contract, they could be
significant to the party who drafted them. While these terms may not
be specifically negotiated in every transaction, it seems reasonable to
conclude that they were made part of a party's standard form because
112. See, e.g., Neugent v. Beroth Oil Co., 560 S.E.2d 829 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
113. See, e.g., Lowe's Cos. v. Lipe, 201 S.E.2d 81 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973).
114. See, e.g., GPL Treatment, 894 P.2d at 477 n.4.
115. With regard to different terms, Professor Farnsworth remarked, "It is difficult
to imagine variations that would not be material." E. Allan Farnsworth, Formation of
Contract, in INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS § 3.04 (Nina M. Galston & Hans Smit eds, 1984).
116. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 19; Secretariat Commentary, supra note 85, art. 17
1j 10.
117. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-207 (2007).
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they were the terms on which that party wanted to transact business.
By substituting the judgment of the tribunal for the judgment of the
parties as to what terms are material, a party may end up bound to a
contact containing terms to which it had not agreed or even
contemplated.
Article 19 of the CISG, which treats an offeror's objection to non-
material additional or different terms in an acceptance as a rejection,
protects the parties from this undesirable outcome and better reflects
the parties' intent. Under Article 19, neither party is bound at the time
of the offeror's objection,118 but a contract could be created by the par-
ties' subsequent conduct.'1 9 If, after receiving notice of the offeror's
objection, the offeree performs as requested by the offeror, it is reason-
able to conclude at that point that the offeree intends to be bound
despite the exclusion of the objectionable terms.
2. Treatment of Different Terms- First Shot vs. Last Shot
The minority approach to different terms in an acceptance
adopted by North Carolina has been criticized by commentators. 120
Although both the first-shot and last-shot rules arbitrarily determine
which party's terms should prevail, the last-shot rule is more in line
with traditional contract formation principles and better approximates
the parties' intent. Generally, an acceptance must be a positive, unam-
biguous, and unequivocal manifestation of assent in order to be effec-
tive. 12 1 An expression of acceptance containing terms different from
those of the offer cannot be considered a manifestation of assent to be
bound by the offer's contradictory terms. Whatever else such an
acceptance may be, it is clearly a rejection of those particular terms.
The last shot rule of Article 19 comes closer to reflecting the par-
ties' intent. Since an acceptance containing different terms rejects on
its face the contradictory terms of the offer, the first-shot rule is not the
best approach. The two alternative approaches are to "knock out" the
different terms and allow the court to impose terms of the contract by
resorting to the supplemental provisions of the U.C.C., or to apply the
118. See Secretariat Commentary, supra note 85, art. 17 11 10.
119. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 18(3).
120. See Franklin G. Snyder, Clouds of Mystery: Dispelling the Realist Rhetoric of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 11 (2007); Corneill A. Stephens, Escape
from the Battle of the Forms: Keep it Simple, Stupid, 11 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 233
(2007).
121. 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 6:10 (4th ed. 1993).
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last-shot rule. 122 By knocking out the different terms and supplement-
ing the parties' agreement in accordance with the U.C.C., it is possible
that the contract will contain terms that neither party intended. If
determining the parties' intent is the interpretive goal, the better
approach is found in Article 19 of the CISG. Under the last-shot
approach of Article 19, the terms of the last form sent control if there is
any disagreement. 123 Logically, this makes sense. The idea is that by
sending an acceptance containing different terms, the offeree has
rejected the contradictory terms in the offer. If the offeror performs
after receiving the acceptance, then it is fair to say that the offeror has
assented to those terms. This places the burden on the offeror to read
the acceptance form and object or decline to perform if he disagrees.
Although this is not a perfect solution, it is more likely to result in an
agreement that reflects the parties' intent and appropriately places the
burden on the offeror to be aware of the language of an acceptance.
D. Contract Interpretation
One of the critical differences between contract interpretation
under the U.C.C. and the CISG is the role of the parties' actual intent.
Because the CISG focuses on subjective intent,' 24 the parties may use
any relevant extrinsic evidence to prove the existence or terms of a
contract. The U.C.C. is less concerned with the parties' subjective
intent; instead, it interprets agreements based on an objective standard:
[Clommon lawyers long ago discarded any attempt to discover the sub-
jective intent of any party to the contract. Though the unfortunate
phrase "meeting of the minds" may appear even in current judicial
opinions, there is no doubt that the phrase must be understood as
requiring only an objective manifestation of assent, as any month old
student of contract law in the United States knows.1
25
The parol evidence rule is a function of the U.C.C.'s objective
approach, and it seemingly values ease and consistency of application
over the consideration of probative evidence of the parties' agreement.
Under North Carolina General Statutes section 25-2-202, if the parties'
confirmatory memorandum objectively appears to be a final and com-
plete expression of their agreement, extrinsic evidence will be inadmis-
122. See Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1579-80 (1984).
123. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 19.
124. See CISG, supra note 3, arts. 8(1), (3).
125. John E. Murray, Jr., An Essay on the Formation of Contracts and Related Matters
under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 8
J.L. & CoM. 11, 46-47 (1988).
294 [Vol. 30:275
20
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol30/iss2/2
WHO'S AFRAID OF THE CISG?
sible to contradict the terms of their written agreement. 126 This
approach necessarily excludes relevant evidence of contractual terms
and potentially obscures the parties' actual intent.
Of course, any decision by a court or arbitral tribunal concerning
the intent of contracting parties will have an objective component. 27
It is impossible to know with certainty the parties' subjective intent at
the time of the conclusion of a contract, but considering "all relevant
circumstances of the case" 128 in order to make a determination is a
better method of objectively evaluating their intent.
CONCLUSION
The CISG is not for everyone, but it may better suit the needs of
parties to international sales contracts than North Carolina's version
of the U.C.C. Unlike the U.C.C., the CISG does not include a statute of
frauds or the parol evidence rule. The CISG also rejects the approach
of North Carolina General Statutes section 25-2-207 to additional or
different terms in an acceptance and maintains the common law "mir-
ror image" and "last shot" rules. Freedom of form and provisions that
give priority to the parties' actual intent allow buyers and sellers to
conduct business without the unnecessary restrictions and delays
caused by the formalities of domestic sales laws.
126. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-202 (2007).
127. See JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 116 (3d ed. 1999) (noting the problems of a purely
subjective approach).
128. CISG, supra note 3, art. 8(3).
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